کارگاه دیالکتیک December 08, 2024

Englisch-Farsi

There is a full-scale political shift underway in Syria; a historical rearrangement of the political scene from above. Although the scene-makers may initially seem invisible, finding their positions in the darkness behind the scenes is not particularly difficult. For the people of the Middle East, who have long had their material existence and social-political fate shaped by the comings and goings of dictators and military powers, this shift (at least symbolically) holds special significance. For people like us, who have experienced the state discourse of “anti-imperialism” and “resistance axis” for many years as a code for the continuation of political repression and social deprivation, reflecting on the hidden dimensions of this power shift can shed light on the walls of the cage we find ourselves trapped in. The main claim of this essay is that the ideological fabric of this cage is made of lies. To assess this claim in light of the transformations currently occurring in Syria, we will briefly look at its implications regarding the role of the Iranian regime and its political and ideological assertions.

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The Islamic State of Iran, while it had retreated its “military advisors” and paramilitary forces under its command in Syria, pretended to be using all its power to save Bashar al-Assad’s government. Despite these diplomatic rhetoric, the Iranian foreign minister, in a more honest statement, simply assigned Assad’s fate to destiny. This premature farewell of the Iranian government to its long-standing geopolitical ally (Bashar al-Assad) occurred despite the fact that the leader of Iran had often referred to the Syrian government – for two decates – with phrases like “the pillar of the resistance axis.”

This sudden shift certainly reflects the inability of the Iranian regime to change the existing equations in the region (as had previously become evident during recent drastic developments in Palestine and Lebanon). However, the more important issue is understanding the reasons behind this incapacity; a weakness that contradicts all the noisy claims of the Islamic Republic regarding its powerful role in providing political “stability” in Syria. From here, one can also test the validity of the Iranian regime’s earlier claims about its regional power and capabilities. Thus, the why and how of suddenly abandoning what was proudly referred to in the Iranian government’s „national security“ discourse as “strategic depth” is a key question for understanding the broader implications of the current fluid situation in Syria.

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At the same time, for the time being, to understand the reasons for the Iranian regime’s blatant incapacity to play a minimal role in its so-calld ‚backyard‘ region, we certainly do not have access to conventional historical facts and documents. Facts that will only years later be revealed as selected fragments from the archives of the security organizations and foreign ministries of the countries involved in the Syrian crisis, as well as from the arbitrary memoirs of former government agents. Instead, we are currently only dealing with scattered evidence based on observations of ongoing events. Nevertheless, even this incomplete and incidental evidence, when placed in a long-term context within the historical dynamic of Middle Eastern developments and the functions of different states, reveals deeper analytical implications. Because whether considering the state apparatus or imperialist relations, insofar as they are part of the mechanisms for the reproduction of the capitalist system, they follow relatively law-like tendencies; even when they conduct their repressive policies through secretive or conspiratorial means.

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Therefore, at least at the present moment, understanding the reasons for the Iranian government’s disgraceful and revealing passivity regarding the current developments in Syria, like many similar phenomena in macro-political analyses, will be based on a type of extrapolation. The result of this analytical approach ultimately leads to a kind of hypothesizing that is colloquially referred to as ‚conjecture‘, which is often associated negatively with the term „speculation“ (1)

Before returning to the main topic of this note, we should mention that due to the lack of access to all the evidence regarding the current developments, and/or potential inadequacies in selecting historical clues for interpreting the existing current evidence, and/or possible deficiencies in the application of intermediary theories to extract the final analytical results, any hypothesizing about the ongoing developments in Syria may be prone to errors or at least accompany serious flaws and biases.

With this extensive introduction, let us turn to the main claim of this text which—based on what has been said—actually is a hypothesis regarding the power dynamics driving the shift in power in Syria. This hypothesis aims to explain the reasons for the passivity of Iranian regime (which was previously regarded as one of the main actors in Syria) during these developments; and thus also test the claims of the Iranian rulers about their regional capabilities.

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The general idea of this hypothesis can be summarized as follows:

The rapid military assaults that brought Bashar al-Assad’s regime to the brink of collapse and the (partial) subsequent swift developments that ultimately led to his downfall are likely the result of an agreement between Putin and Trump to end the war in Ukraine. The price that the Russian government has to pay for a triumphant (dignified) conclusion to its costly war against Ukraine apparently involves ceding the future management of Syrian affairs to the U.S. government and its allies. From this, it can be concluded that if the Iranian regime had previously any foothold in Syria, it was entirely due to the strategic decision of the Russian government to play the Syrian card in its permanent struggles with the Western axis of imperialist powers. Now that Putin has seemingly decided to spend his surplus resources from this bloody thirteen-year game elsewhere, there is no longer a need for the unwavering services of a deluded compliant ally like the Iranian regime in Syria.


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But what evidence exists to support this hypothesis?

While Trump has promised to end the war in Ukraine in the shortest time possible, Putin is also strongly seeking a „reasonable“ (cost-effective) way to extricate himself from the internal and external costs of the invasion of Ukraine; a way that ensures a degree of geopolitical gains to preserve Russia’s „national pride“ and maintain Putin’s authoritative image domestically. Meanwhile, NATO leaders (under Biden’s administration) have not provided Putin with a „reasonable“ deal for a „dignified“ end to the war in Ukraine; instead, they have largely taken the path of providing increasing financial and military support to the Ukrainian government. Trump’s magical mediation claim could, hence, serve as a suitable alternative for Putin. The expansion of Russian military assaults on Ukraine and the advances made in recent weeks are signs of Putin’s willingness and readiness to come to the negotiating table with a full hand in the near future. Furthermore, from the Kremlin’s perspective, there are once again concerning „anti-Russian“ movements occurring along Russia’s southern border (Georgia), which require greater concentration for management.

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It should be noted that the prolonged war in Ukraine, alongside high human casualties for the Russian army (and people), has imposed heavy costs on Russia’s fragile economy and consequently increased the level of domestic dissatisfaction with the continuation of the war (as well as Putin’s policies). On the other hand, for the major European governments, the continuation of the war in Ukraine (and the obligation to provide financial-military supports to the Ukrainian government) has led to increased economic costs and socio-political discontent. At the same time, by dragging North Korea into this war (through receiving/purchasing military and personnel support), and by escalating the threatening rhetoric regarding the potential use of certain types of nuclear weapons, Putin has given a more aggressive dimension to this war to exert greater pressure on Ukraine’s Western supporters [Let us not forget that Putin had previously drawn Iran into the fray of this war on a smaller scale – by providing attack drones and certain types of missiles]. Therefore, under such circumstances, European governments also have an increasing desire to end the war in Ukraine and thus to make a „final deal“ with Putin. (2)

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Undoubtedly, there are other pieces of evidence to support the hypothesis presented regarding the reasons for the shift of power in Syria, but there is not enough space here to mention all of them (and perhaps it is not even necessary). Among them, for example, the following can at least be noted: the Russian air forces (stationed in Syria) made no significant effort to prevent the lightning advances of the Tahrir al-Sham militant forces, etc. In contrast, according Russian media, the Russian government has received the necessary guarantees for the security of its air and military bases in Syria through agreements with the leaders of the militants.“
Consequently, the military and paramilitary forces under the command of the Iranian regime also did nothing but „orderly retreat.“ On the other hand, the Iraqi government and the famous Hashd al-Shabi paramilitia forces, which had always been considered to be under the command of the Iranian government, also opted for neutrality and non-intervention in Syria. Even the official Syrian army showed little resistance, despite some initial sporadic clashes. Thus, the necessary space for the rapid advance of Turkey-connected

Islamist rebels was provided from all sides. A factor that cannot be overlooked is this ironic twist of history, where Bashar al-Assad and his family (and possibly a larger circle of Syrian elites) received refuge in the arms of Russia; the very power that had protected them from the wrath of the oppressed for several years, only to sell them at a higher price when the conditions became favorable [Explaining Putin’s dealings with the Iranian government — including his dealings with the Iranian rulers themselves — will undoubtedly be the subject of many investigations and publications; even though the neo-colonial relationship between Russia and Iran has not yet concluded, and sections of the content of future research books remain unwritten].

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So far, we have pointed out the reasons (or the possibility conditions) of the current multilateral political transaction around Syria. However, the manner of its realization has depended on the role of other actors, among which the Turkish government has undoubtedly played a fundamental place: not only due to the fact that the „Tahrir al-Sham“ and the „Syrian National Army“ have had explicit political-military ties to the Turkish government, but also due to the announced geopolitical interests and specific concerns of Turkish government regarding the political future of Syria; interests that are mainly justified and represented under the necessity of comprehensive confrontation with „terrorism“ (from Erdogan’s perspective: the Kurdish movement) and the return and resettlement of war-displaced Syrian refugees. The very establishment, support, and equipping of fundamentalist paramilitary forces in Syria by the Turkish government since 2011 (alongside similar efforts by the governments of Iran and Saudi Arabia) has been in pursuit of these geopolitical and expansionist interests. However, the fact that the Turkish government has issued the order to attack Damascus precisely at this moment in time (coinciding with the weakening of the military and political capacity of Hezbollah in Lebanon and the resurgence of Trump in U.S.A) is neither a coincidence nor the result of Erdogan’s initiative. The initiation of this large military-political project without the green light from the central powers of the world (especially the U.S. government and its Western allies) was essentially impossible.

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At the same time, we know that no major project within the territory of Syria, as a battleground for the proxy confrontation between the Russian government and its Western adversaries, can be imagined without coordination with the Russian actor. We have previously mentioned why Russia was willing to ‚trade‘ the privileges of its long-term presence in the political-military arena of Syria for a ’specific price‘ with its Western rivals. Therefore, Erdogan’s hypothetical ‚initiative‘ was indeed accompanied by prior confirmations from both Western and Eastern actors. The fact that Erdogan, with his characteristic arrogance and haughty tone, takes on the role of the actor in this action (for example, in remarks like, ‚We hope these forces [Tahrir al-Sham, etc.] advance to Damascus without any particular problem’… ‚I had previously told Assad to let’s determine the future of Syria together, but he did not respond adequately‘) is merely a promotional tactic aimed at maintaining Erdogan’s political authority among public opinion in Turkey, especially among his supporter base; something akin to the usual play of autocrats using the cards of nationalism and grandiosity. The fact that the great powers have allowed this ‚initiative‘ to be attributed to Erdogan is simply a continuation of their contemporary approach in outsourcing some imperialistic tasks to local/regional powers.

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The relevant global powers, by opting for this form of overthrowing Assad’s government, have clearly: absolved themselves of the accusation of direct association with individuals and forces that were previously identified as fundamentalist terrorists (the United States had offered a reward for the living or dead of Abu Muhammad al-Joulani, the leader of Tahrir al-Sham); distanced themselves from responsibility concerning the humanitarian atrocities committed by the fundamentalist insurgents in the fragmented and crisis-ridden society of Syria; and removed the possibility of any legal prosecution (even if symbolic) within the frail international legal system, due to the overthrow of a legitimate government, and curtailed any potential political repercussions of this in domestic factional competitions. Even the Turkish government, if necessary in the future, could attribute the agency of this action/insurgency to Syrian forces and internal conflicts within Syria, just as the 13-year-long proxy war of global and regional powers in the territory of Syria has been represented in mainstream discourse as a ‚civil war.‘ At the same time, it should not be forgotten that Assad’s government is so discredited and despised in the public opinion within Syria and the world that it is unlikely that a significant political protest/action against this ‚grand joint project‘ to overthrow Assad will arise.

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Now let’s return to the motivations behind Trump and the future U.S. government in this ‚deal‘: Trump’s main motivation is certainly to assert a strong presence both domestically and globally, which, by fulfilling his promises, will simultaneously confirm his claims of sincerity and prudence. Through this approach, Trump aims to ‚end‘ two chronic global crises, which the Biden administration has been inept or negligent in addressing/handling; thus Trump has calculated to achieve multiple objectives with one move. Beyond that, Trump is simultaneously trying to provide a political benefit to the Israeli government and its influential supporters in the realm of U.S. domestic politics, to solidify his political footing in a second term as president of the United States. It is clear that the Israeli government and its supporters have a particular interest in such political shift in Syria, at least for the stated reason that Syria should no longer serve as a backyard for Iranian military elements and Hezbollah. (3)

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However, what are the implications of this power shift in Syria from the perspective of the geopolitical standing of the Iranian rulers and their ideological claims?

First, the Iranian government could never hold significant political and military positions in Syria without the approval, support, and directives from the Russian government. Just as, without a certain level of approval and consent (or at least tolerance from the U.S. government), the Iranian regime could never have established a strong foothold in post-2003 Iraq. (Regardless of how the Iranian regime later leveraged this geopolitical advantage after strategically pivoting towards Russia and China.) Following 2011, the Russian government, according to the logic of imperialist proxy wars, deliberately allowed the Iranian regime to exert extensive military (and political) influence in Syria; because the concrete practical capabilities and political-ideological motivations of Iran’s rulers aligned precisely with Russia’s imperialistic objectives in Syria (in line with the ‚Great Powers‘ game). The Russian government even permitted the Iranian rulers to engage in grandiose/exaggerated geopolitical claims regarding their political-military influence in Syria; because through this ‚outsourcing of agency‘ (though apparent), the integrity of the ‚Tsar of Russia‘ despite the bloody and tragic developments in Syria was best preserved. Furthermore, two other factors should be taken into account: The intensification of Iran’s aggressive and showy maneuvers in the region (after its apparent dominance in Syria) provided a significant ground for advancing Israel’s colonial-aggressive policies. And, advancing these maneuvers was aligned with the well-known imperialistic strategy of militarizing the Middle East. Both factors, hence, aligned well with the strategic interests of the United States and its Western partners. But just after the Great Powers have devised a new plan for Syria (and possibly the Middle East), the noisy and self-displaying presence of the Iranian regime in Syria was dismantled.

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This historical experience indicates that the reproduction of imperialist relations in the Middle East is advanced through the (controlled) functions of local autocratic governments. In this context, a degree of delegation of authority to these ‚regional powers‘ aligns with the grandiose ambitions of the rulers of these countries and the long-standing geopolitical-ideological struggles among them, as well as their geo-economic competitions. Amid this relative outsourcing of providing the ‚order‘ (chaos) in the Middle East to the regional powers, these governments (mainly including Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, and Egypt) have increasingly turned to the expansion of militarism, regional interventions, and the permanent establishment of reciprocal threats. This, in turn, ensures the maintenance of a chaotic and militaristic atmosphere in the Middle East, while facilitating the suppression of progressive movements and uprisings in the societies governed by these regimes (it should be recalled that the continuous expansion of Iran’s military-security apparatus has been one of the key factors in the final defeats of successive mass uprisings since December 2017 till Jina uprising). Thus, the Middle East remains in a fragile (but reproducible) balance centered around global capitalism (fulfilling its needs), without the oppressed under this imposed order being practically able to envision a viable path to emancipation from this vicious cycle.

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From what has been said, we can highlight the old notion that the primary sphere of power

and agency for the Iranian regime is not in the decisive equations of the Middle East, but rather in the realm of internal repression; a place where the Islamic State fulfills the critical function of autocratic states in the Global South, which is nothing but the crushing of the inevitable resistances of the oppressed. This does not negate the regional and geopolitical functions and (partial) influences of the Iranian regime in reproducing global relations of dominance in this part of the world; rather, it emphasizes the fact that the relative delegation of agency to a local state like the Islamic Republic by the global powers is solely dedicated and conditioned on its primary functions aimed at restraining and suppressing the actual and potential agency of the oppressed; whether in the geography of Iran or at the level of the Middle East (in this regard, the tragic fate of the Sudanese revolution provides a vivid example: where the main counter-revolutionary mechanisms, namely the strengthening and stabilization of Sudanese military forces and the incitement and support of tragic military confrontation among Sudanese generals, were realized by the interventions of regional governments such as the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt). This proposition also does not negate the reality of conflicts among global powers or the competitive struggles of imperialist forces in the recent multipolar order. Because if contemporary imperialism operates within the framework of capitalist relations, ultimately aimed at reproducing these relations, central capitalist powers, despite all their differences and conflicts, are necessarily compelled to agree and collude on the necessity of restraining and suppressing the resistances of the oppressed. In other words, they must maintain the common ground beneath their feet above all else. At the same time, global powers do not limit themselves to the conventional practice of outsourcing direct repression to local autocrats (‚proxy repressions‘) for achieving their shared goal-necessity of restraining the oppressed. Rather, alongside this, they actively strive to interfere in (and manipulate) mass movements and uprisings to integrate their final direction within the dominant capitalist logic and the existing world order; a mechanism whose advancement is made possible by the internal divergences and conflicts of contemporary mass uprisings as well as their internal weaknesses. Since a significant portion of the weaknesses and internal conflicts of mass uprisings in the ‚Global South‘ stems from the unfavorable conditions of their formation (where the lived experiences of the oppressed occurs under political repression and in the imposed neoliberal environment), it can be said that the direct and indirect support of imperialist powers for autocratic regimes enables these powers to transform the inevitable mass uprisings. A clear example of how this mechanism operates is the gradual transformation of the Jina uprising (2021) into a nationalist-neoliberal discourse, which was completed with the extensive support of Western governments for the ‚alternative‘ royalist and nationalist fractions during the this uprising.

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And now, a word about how to test the hypothesis presented in this essay:

The most important tangible (historical-concrete) fact that can confirm or refute the main body of the hypothesis regarding the underlying equations of power shift in Syria is how the ‚peace negotiations‘ in Ukraine progress in the near future: assuming that in the meantime, no major unexpected event disrupts the current configuration of regional and global situations, the realization of such negotiations would serve as evidence for the validity of this hypothesis; and conversely. Nevertheless, even if this immature hypothesis about the origins of current developments and the power shifts in Syria is incorrect, it does not call into question the clues extracted from the history of imperialist interventions in the Middle East; nor does it—in itself—invalidate a reading of the Marxist theory of imperialism, which has been the mediator of the extraction of basic conclusions used for proposing this hypothesis.

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Certainly, we do not know how the political future of Syria, the subsequent configuration of state structures, and political forces involved will unfold. The only thing that can be conjectured with high certainty (based on past pieces of evidence) is that all global powers—soon—will recognize the Tahrir al-Sham as the political representatives of the new Syria; and at least, in the same manner as the de facto recognition of the Taliban after the ‚Fall of Kabul‘ (summer 2021), they will collaborate with these forces (claiming a ‚popular revolution‘ in Syria) to ensure that the new political order in Syria does not transcend the frameworks established in the global system of dominance, and its components in the Middle East. In other words, the outcome of the current developments in Syria will in no way lead to the formation of a conventional democratic government (even by minimal standards); as multiple historical evidence in the Middle East (at least since the invasion of Western forces into Iraq in 2003) has shown that imperial political configurations, which are inherently top-down processes, have no alignment with the real interests and democratic demands of the peoples of the Middle East. Also, based on historical evidence from the past, it may not be an baseless conjecture that—in the best case—a politcal model similar to post-2003 Iraq awaits the people of Syria; with the difference that there will be significantly less room for ideological influence and political-military interventions from the Iranian regime; It is more likely that the Turkish government will appear as the apparent orchestrator of the upcoming developments in Syria. It is clear that in this case, a hard and tumultuous (if not catastrophic) era lies ahead for the Kurdish movement, the progressive forces in Syria, and the majority of the downtrodden in the geography of Syria.

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Although it is understandable that now many people in Syria and Iran, as well as other communities in the Middle East, are pleased and happy with the fall of Bashar al-Assad, one cannot subscribe to viewpoints that evaluate this top-down power shift as ‚promising‘ in itself. What can be said—especially based on the content of this essay—is that this power shift has been based on „removal of agency“ (‚disempowerment‘) of the oppressed people of Syria (through the ‚cleansing‘ of the political arena of progressive forces, paving the way for the growth and dominance of jihadist forces, and ultimately utilizing a portion of these forces for the power shift). Moreover, this power shift is also intended to create conditions for the continuity of this disempowerment in the ’new free Syria.‘ Therefore, what we know with certainty is that any emancipating project in the Middle East necessitates the restoration of agency for the oppressed in this very geography of oppression. The recovery of this agency undoubtedly requires pathways for the solidarity of the oppressed in the Middle East.

Notes:

1. Hypothesizing in the realm of analyzing political-social phenomena is usually referred to as speculation. Speculation is often viewed as being based on „conspiracy thinking“ because, it is often believed that, it ostensibly lacks a factual basis. However, hypothesizing is partly a necessity for understanding phenomena for which there is insufficient or currently unavailable data. In fact, an important function of a hypothesis is to provide plausible pathways for searching for the missing facts/data regarding the phenomenon under study (for example, in the field of natural sciences, by proposing specific plans for experimentation that themselves generate new facts/data). Therefore, equating hypothesizing with conspiracy thinking denies a significant part of the history of science and the practical reality of scientific inquiry. Furthermore, the prevalence of such equivalence in the mainstream media and social-science is generally a tool in the hands of the knowledge-power monopolists to delegitimize critical lines of inquiry regarding mainstream truth claims, compelling the marginalized to conform to the dominant social knowledge/ideas and accept the official representations of social-historical facts. The distinctive capability of this tool for influence lies in intimidating the audience through the normative language of the positivist account of „scientific method.“

The „accusation of conspiracy thinking“ also serves to reproduce power relations in which conspiracies and delibrate plots against the interests of the oppressed form an integral part of their executive toolbox. Here, the application of this tool is directed towards rendering the conspiratorial mechanisms in governance and international politics invisible, with the argument that as long as we do not have documented and solid facts, we are not allowed/elligible to „speculate“ about the potential roles of „unverified“ factors in the emergence of a particular polito-historical phenomenon. At the same time, in the realm of state governance, there are specific structures and mechanisms (such as security agencies) aimed at institutionalizing a lack of transparency, the main function of which is to deprive the oppressed of necessary facts and documentation to better analyze and understand their own conditions of opposition.

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2. The central topic of the conversation between Olaf Scholz, the Chancellor of Germany, and Donald Trump during their recent meeting was how to bring an end to the war in Ukraine. During this same European trip (under the pretext of attending the reopening ceremony of Notre-Dame Cathedral), Trump also had an extensive discussion with Volodymyr Zelensky, the President of Ukraine.

3.

During these tumultuous days in Syria, the Israeli army, under the pretext of securing its borders with Syria, advanced 15 kilometers into the occupied Golan Heights and even imposed restrictions on movement in five Syrian towns within this border region.

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کارگاه دیالکتیکDecember 08, 2024

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